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Abstract
Three of the most fundamental changes in US corporations since the early 1970s have
been (1) the increased importance of organizational capital in production, (2) the increase in
managerial income inequality and pay-performance sensitivity, and (3) the secular decrease
in labor market reallocation. Our paper develops a simple explanation for these changes: a
shift in the composition of productivity growth away from vintage-specific to general growth.
This shift has stimulated the accumulation of organizational capital in existing firms and
reduced the need for reallocating workers to new firms. We characterize the optimal man-
agerial compensation contract when firms accumulate organizational capital but risk-averse
managers cannot commit to staying with the firm. A calibrated version of the model repro-
duces the increase in managerial compensation inequality and the increased sensitivity of pay
to performance in the data over the last three decades.
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1 Introduction
Three of the most fundamental changes in US corporations since the early 1970s have been (1)
the apparent increase in the importance of organizational capital in production, (2) the increase
in managerial income inequality and pay-performance sensitivity and (3) the secular decrease in
labor market reallocation. Our paper provides an explanation for these changes.
This evidence is consistent with a shift in the composition of productivity growth away from
vintage-specific growth, which only affects new firms, to more general productivity growth, which
makes all firms more productive. In our model, the vintage-specific growth rate is the depreciation
rate of organizational capital in existing firms. The shift allows successful firms to grow larger
because their organizational capital effectively depreciates at a slower rate. This results in fewer
firm exits and less labor reallocation from old to new firms. The growth composition shift allows
our model to match the secular decline in the job reallocation rate in the US economy since the
early 1970s, as documented by Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2006) and Faberman
(2006).1 We attribute the change in the composition of productivity growth, the key driving force
in the model, to the diffusion of information technology. However, our model applies to any other
explanation for this shift, such as a change in the composition of the work force.
The change in productivity growth composition and the widespread accumulation of organiza-
tional capital that resulted creates a new problem for successful firms: how to distribute the rents
from organizational capital? The firms’ managers have de facto ownership rights on organizational
capital, which makes it different from physical capital. These ownership rights arise from their
ability to leave the firm, and to take some of its organizational capital to a new firm. Our paper
studies the distribution of organizational rents between the owners and the managers in such an
environment.
In the data, the dispersion of managerial compensation across firms is much wider now than
35 years ago. In large, successful firms, which accumulate a lot of organizational capital, man-
agerial compensation has increased substantially, while it has not in small firms. We propose an
equilibrium theory that ties the accumulation of organizational capital, induced by the shift in
the composition of productivity growth, to managerial compensation. A calibrated version of the
model can quantitatively account for a large share of these changes in the US economy.
The key element of the model is the optimal managerial compensation contract. This contract
insures the risk averse manager against shocks to the firm’s productivity. Insurance is provided
because the manager can only work for one firm while the owner invests in a diversified portfolio of
firms. But there is only partial insurance because the manager can quit and transfer some of the
1The declining volatility of firm growth rates, documented by Davis et al. (2006) for the entire universe of
privately-held and publicly-traded firms, is consistent with this decline. Our model also implies that the fraction
of output produced in older establishments increased, also consistent with the findings of Davis et al. (2006). The
model of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2007) also relies on the decline in labor reallocation.
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organizational capital to a new firm. The degree of portability of organizational capital governs
the value of the manager’s outside option and determines how much risk sharing can be sustained
between the manager and the owner. Dunne, Foster, Haltiwanger and Troske (2004) document
a sizeable increase in within-industry between-establishment wage dispersion, while Frydman and
Saks (2006)’s data show that this increase in dispersion is even higher for executives. A calibrated
version of our model can match most of the increase in compensation inequality if we assume that
half of the organizational capital is portable. However, this calibration can only match half of the
observed increase in Tobin’s q. Lowering the portability increases Tobin’s q by more, but reduces
the impact on compensation inequality. In the extreme case where organizational capital is not
portable and managers can commit to stay, the change in the composition of productivity growth
has no impact on compensation inequality.
Why does the growth composition shift increase the dispersion of managerial compensation?
As long as firms are small, the manager’s outside option constraint does not bind, and the optimal
contract prescribes constant managerial compensation (relative to aggregate output). However,
when a firm’s size exceeds a threshold, optimal management compensation is increasing in the
firm’s organizational capital. The increased accumulation of organizational capital, resulting from
the growth composition change, improves the manager’s outside option in successful firms. To
retain the manager, the owner of the firm increases compensation in response to high productiv-
ity. At the aggregate level, the change in the firm size distribution that results from the growth
composition shift triggers an endogenous shift from low-powered to high-powered incentive com-
pensation contracts. Such a shift seems consistent with the increased pay-performance sensitivity
of employment contracts since the 1970s. If the manager is more impatient then the owner, this
shift is further amplified.
Our model has several additional, “out-of-sample” implications which are borne out in the
data. First, it matches the sensitivity of log compensation to log firm size in the U.S.; see Edmans,
Gabaix and Landier (2007). Second, it matches the cross-sectional correlation between valuation
and wage dispersion in the data. We identify high vintage-specific growth industries as those
with low managerial wage dispersion. As predicted by the model, we find that these industries
accumulate less organizational capital, using Tobin’s q as our measure. The effects are large.
We find that a one standard deviation increase in wage dispersion increases Tobin’s q by 6 basis
points using a broad measure of wage dispersion and by 14 basis points for executive compensation
dispersion. These effects of executive wage compensation are stronger in industries with more
intangibles. Wheeler (2005) shows that within-industry wage inequality is much higher in industries
with higher frequency of computer usage, which are industries with lower vintage-specific growth
in our model.
2
Related Literature Our model combines the technology side of the vintage capital model of
Atkeson and Kehoe (2005, 2007) with an optimal compensation contract for managers. The litera-
ture on optimal compensation contracts builds on Harris and Holmstrom (1982)’s seminal paper on
optimal long-term wage contracts with learning about the manager’s productivity. As in Harris and
Holmstrom (1982), our optimal compensation dynamics display downward rigidity. This rigidity is
generated by the inability of managers to commit to staying in the firm. There is scope for insur-
ance when at least some of the organizational capital is specific to the match between the owner
and the manager. Neal (1995) provides empirical evidence on the importance of match-specific
capital. Related applications of optimal compensation contracts in finance are Berk, Stanton and
Zechner (2005), Clementi, Cooley and Wang (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2002), and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004), Falato and Kadyrzhanova (2008),
DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), Biais, Mariotti and Rochet (2007), Opp (2007), He (2007), and
DeMarzo, Fishman, He and Wang (2007). Most of this work examines the optimal capital structure
of the firm in the presence of moral hazard in partial equilibrium. Instead, our paper examines
the optimal management compensation contract in the presence of portable capital in a general
equilibrium model.
We use these contracts to connect changes in the distribution of firm size to changes in the
distribution of managerial compensation. In closely related work, Gabaix and Landier (2008)
explain the increased dispersion of CEO compensation in a matching model with an exogenously
changing size distribution. Our paper endogenizes both the evolution of the size and the managerial
compensation distribution and explicitly models the compensation contract. In addition, we derive
a theoretical link between the size and book-to-market ratio of a firm and its labor compensation
contracts. A related literature studies the relationship of firm characteristics such as leverage and
riskiness of cash-flows to firm valuation in dynamic settings; see Gomes and Livdan (2004), Gomes
and Schmid (2007), Hennessy and Whited (2007), Strebulaev (2007), Gourio (2007), Chen (2008).
In recent work, Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2008) study the risk characteristics of organizational
capital.
A large literature documents the increase of wage inequality in the US in the last three decades
and its relation to technological change (Violante (2002), Guvenen and Kuruscu (2007), Autor,
Katz and Kearny (2007), and Acemoglu (2002) for a survey). Our paper contributes to this liter-
ature by generating an endogenous switch to high-powered incentives contracts and by connecting
the changing distribution of payouts to workers to the payouts to the owners of the capital stock,
and ultimately to firm value. With the exception of Merz and Yahsiv (2003), Papanikolaou (2007),
Bazdrech, Belo and Lin (2008), and Parlour and Walden (2008), the link between labor compen-
sation and firm value is usually ignored in the literature. Parlour and Walden (2008) characterize
optimal compensation contracts in the presence of moral hazard and derive predictions relating
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workers compensation, firm productivity, firm size and firm value.
One prominent example of the technological change we have in mind is the information tech-
nology revolution after 1973. As its efficiency improved and its price dropped, the use of IT spread,
and its adoption affected all sectors of the economy. By now, there is overwhelming evidence that
computers have fundamentally altered firms’ business processes, relationships with customers and
suppliers, and internal organization. E.g., Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1997, 2000), Bresnahan, Bryn-
jolfsson and Hitt (2002), and an entire volume of contributions on organizational capital in the new
economy by Corrado, Haltiwanger and Sichel, eds (2005). The literature convincingly argues that
the gradual adoption of IT, a General Purpose Technology (Bresnahan and Trachtenberg (1996)),
has increased the productivity of successful establishments of all vintages, not only the new ones.
There is indirect evidence that organizational capital is more important in production than three
decades ago from the stock market’s valuation of US corporations; see e.g. Hall (2001). More-
over, organizational capital and IT are complementary inputs, and investment in IT has increased
substantially since the 1970s (Bresnahan et al. (2002)). Finally, there is direct evidence on the
link between IT and organizational capital and the increased importance of organizational capital.
Using micro data, Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2008) explain the productivity miracle in the
US and its absence in Europe by means of a US advantage in IT that is “primarily due to its people
management practices on promotions, rewards, hiring and firing”.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the technology side of the model and the
compensation contract between manager and owner, and defines an equilibrium with a continuum
of managers and firms along a steady-state growth path. Section 3 highlights the properties of the
optimal compensation contract along a steady-state growth path. Its dynamics are fully captured
by the current and the highest-ever productivity level of the firm. Managerial compensation in-
creases whenever a new maximum productivity level is reached. These two state variables have
a natural interpretation as the size and market-to-book ratio of the firm. Our model ties these
two characteristics to the value of the firm and the compensation of its management. Section 4
describes the calibration of the model. We introduce a gradual increase in general productivity
growth and an offsetting reduction in vintage-specific productivity growth so that the total growth
rate is constant. The magnitude of this compositional shift is calibrated to match the observed
decline in labor reallocation. A second key parameter is the portability of organizational capital. It
is calibrated to match the increase in income inequality. Interestingly, the model’s cross-sectional
distribution of managerial pay shares many features with the observed distribution: it is skewed,
fat-tailed, and has the correct relation with firm size. The model also delivers an increase in
pay-performance sensitivity similar to the one in the data. Finally, Section 5 provides additional
cross-sectional evidence for the effect of managerial compensation inequality on valuations.
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2 Model
We set up a model with a fixed population (mass 1) of managers. Each manager is matched to an
owner to form an establishment.2 The formation of a new establishment incurs a one-time fixed
cost St. Establishments accumulate knowledge as long as the match lasts. We refer to this stock
of knowledge as organizational capital At. This organizational capital affects the technology of
production; it is a third factor of production besides physical capital and unskilled labor, earning
organizational rents.
We assume that a part of the establishment’s organizational capital is embodied in the manager.
It is neither fully match-specific, as in Atkeson and Kehoe (2005), nor fully manager-specific. The
main innovation of our work is to find the optimal division of organizational rents between the
owner and the manager, as governed by an optimal long-term risk-sharing contract in the spirit
of Harris and Holmstrom (1982). We solve for the optimal contract recursively (e.g., Thomas
and Worall (1988) and Kocherlakota (1996)), but we use a different state variable from the one
commonly used in the literature. The optimal contract maximizes the present discounted value of
the organizational rents flowing to the owner subject to the manager’s promise keeping constraint
and a sequence of participation constraints that reflect the manager’s inability to commit to the
current match. We deviate from Krueger and Uhlig (2005) by assuming that the owner has limited
liability. Separation occurs whenever there is no joint surplus left in the match. Upon separation,
a fraction 0 < φ < 1 of the organizational capital can be transferred to the manager’s next match,
while the remainder is destroyed. If the manager could commit to staying in the match or if none
of the organizational capital was destroyed when the manager left the firm, then the changing
composition of productivity growth would have no effect on the distribution of compensation.
We start by setting up the model and defining a steady-state growth path. In Section 4, we
trace out the transition between two steady-state growth paths.
2.1 Technology
On the technology side, our model follows Atkeson and Kehoe (2005). Each establishment belongs
to a vintage s. An establishment of vintage s at time t was born at t−s. An establishment operates
a vintage-specific technology that uses unskilled labor (lt), physical capital (kt), and organizational
capital (At) as its inputs. Output generated with this technology is yt:
yt = zt (At)
1−ν F (kt, lt)
ν .
2We use the words establishment and firm interchangeably. The manager can be interpreted as the entire
management team.
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Following Lucas (1978), ν is the ‘span of control’ parameter of the manager. It governs the
decreasing returns to scale at the establishment level.
There is no aggregate uncertainty in our model. There are two sources of productivity growth,
which we label general and vintage-specific growth. The general productivity level zt grows at a
deterministic and constant rate gz:
zt = (1 + gz)zt−1.
General productivity growth affects establishments of all vintages alike. General productivity
growth is often referred to as disembodied technical change. In addition, it is skill-neutral because
it affects all three production inputs symmetrically.
Following Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), the match-specific level of organizational capital,
At, follows an exogenous process. It is hit by random match-specific shocks ε, drawn from a
distribution N(0, σ2):
logAt+1 = logAt + log εt+1. (2.1)
We do not explicitly model the learning process that underlies the accumulation process of orga-
nizational capital. However, the ε shocks can be interpreted as productivity gains derived from
active or passive learning, from matching, or from adoption of new technologies in existing firms,
as Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) point out.3
A new establishment can always start with a blue print or frontier technology level θt: At ≥ θt.
The productivity level of the blue print grows at a deterministic and constant rate gθ:
θt = (1 + gθ)θt−1.
This vintage-specific growth is often referred to as embodied technical change.
2.2 Contract Between Owner and Manager
Owner There is a stand-in owner who is perfectly diversified.4 He maximizes the expected
present discounted value of aggregate payouts from all establishments Dt using a discount rate rt:
E0
∞∑
t=0
e−
∑t
s=0 rsDt = Vt +Kt. (2.2)
3Additionally, they can be interpreted as reduced-form for heterogeneity across managers, or for the outcomes
from good or bad decisions made by the manager. Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and
Wolfenzon (2007), and Bloom and Van Reenen (2006) show that heterogeneity across managers leads to heterogeneity
in firm outcomes. Jovanovic and Nyarko (1982) explicitly model learning-by-doing and McGrattan and Prescott
(2007) and Carlin, Chowdhry and Garmaise (2008) explicitly model the accumulation of intangible capital.
4Equivalently, there is a continuum of atomless and identical owners.
6
This object is the value of the aggregate capital stock Vt+Kt, which consists of the physical capital
Kt and the owner’s residual claim to the aggregate rents from organizational capital, denoted Vt.
The owner’s value of organizational capital is the expected present discounted value of the aggregate
stream of cash flows {Πt} that not already claimed by the other factors:
Πt = Yt −WtLt − RtKt − Ct − S
a
t , (2.3)
where WtLt is the aggregate compensation of unskilled labor, RtKt that of physical capital, Ct the
aggregate compensation of all the managers of the establishments, and Sat ≡ NtSt the total sunk
costs incurred for starting Nt new establishments. Since we assume that the owner also owns the
physical capital stock Kt, aggregate payouts to the owner Dt are the sum of organizational rents
and the factor payments to physical capital less physical investment:
Dt = Πt +RtKt − It, ∀t.
Since the sunk cost is lost, value-added is defined as Yt − S
a
t .
An individual establishment’s organizational rents (before sunk costs and physical capital in-
come) accruing to its owners are defined with lower-case letters:
pit = yt −Wtlt −Rtkt − ct.
Manager The owner offers the manager a complete contingent contract {ct(h
t), βt(h
t)} at the
start of the match, where ct(h
t) is the compensation of the manager as a function of the history of
shocks ht = (εt, εt−1, ...) and βt(h
t) is a governs whether the match is dissolved or not in history
ht. This contract cannot be renegotiated. The manager can always accept a job at another
establishment, while the owner has limited liability.
The optimal contract maximizes the total expected payoff of the owner subject to delivering
initial utility v0 to the manager:
v0(h
0) = Eh0
[
∞∑
τ=0
e−ρmt
cτ (h
τ )1−γ
1− γ
]
.
The manager is risk averse with CRRA parameter γ and his time discount rate is denoted ρm. In
general, the history-dependence of the manager’s compensation makes this a complicated problem.
However, as is common in the literature on dynamic contracts, we use the manager’s promised
utility as a state variable to make the problem recursive. The contract delivers vt in total ex-
pected utility to the manager today by delivering current compensation ct and state-contingent
compensation promises vt+1(·) tomorrow. These promised utilities lie on a domain [v, v].
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We use Vt(At, vt) to denote the value of the owner’s equity in an establishment with current
organizational capital At, and an outstanding promise to deliver vt to the manager. It is the value
of the owner’s claim to the rents from organizational capital. This does not include the value of
income from physical capital. Importantly, the owner has limited liability; the option to terminate
the contract when there is no joint surplus in the match. Limited liability implies the constraint:
Vt(At, vt) ≥ 0.
Finally, we use ωt(At) to denote the outside option of a manager currently employed in an
establishment with organizational capital At. When a manager switches to a new match, a fraction
φ of the organizational capital is transferred to the next match and a fraction 1− φ is destroyed.
Free disposal applies: If the manager brings organizational capital worth less than the current
blue print θt, then the new match starts off with the blue print technology for the new vintage.
Taken together, the organizational capital of a match of vintage t is max{φAt, θt}. The value of
the outside option ω is determined in equilibrium by a zero-profit condition for new firm entry.
Recursive Formulation For given outside option {ωt} and discount rate {rt} processes, the
optimal contract in an establishment that has promised vt to its manager maximizes the owner’s
value V
Vt(At, vt) = max
[
V̂t(At, vt), 0
]
, (2.4)
and
V̂t(At, vt) = max
ct,vt+1(·)
[
pit +
∫
e−rtV (At+1, vt+1)Γ(εt+1)dεt+1
]
, (2.5)
by choosing the state-contingent promised utility schedule vt+1(·) and the current compensation
ct, subject to the law of motion for organizational capital (2.1), a promise keeping constraint
vt = u(ct) + e
−ρm
∫
βt+1(vt, εt+1)vt+1(At+1)Γ(εt+1)dεt+1
+e−ρm
∫
ωt+1(At+1)(1− βt+1(vt, εt+1))Γ(εt+1)dεt+1 (2.6)
and a series of participation constraints
vt+1(At+1) ≥ ωt+1(At+1). (2.7)
The indicator variable β is one if continuation is optimal and 0 elsewhere:
βt+1 = 1 if vt+1(At+1) ≤ v
∗(At+1)
βt+1 = 0 elsewhere.
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The minimum at zero in equation (2.4) for the owner’s value reflects limited liability of the
owner: The match is terminated if the joint surplus of the match is negative. If the match is
dissolved, the manager receives ωt+1(At+1) in promised utility. To obtain this recursive formulation,
we have used the fact that Vt(At, ·) is non-increasing in its second argument. For each At, there
exists a cutoff value v∗(At) that satisfies V̂t(At, v
∗(At)) = 0. The match is dissolved when the
compensation promised to the manager exceeds the cutoff level: βt+1 = 0 if and only if vt+1(At+1) >
v∗(At+1). Put differently, only establishments with high enough productivity At > At(vt) survive.
2.3 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a price vector {Wt, Rt, rt}, an allocation vector {kt, lt, ct, βt}, an
outside option process {ωt}, and a sequence of distributions {Ψt,s, λt,s, Nt} that satisfy optimality
and market clearing conditions spelled out below.
Physical Capital and Unskilled Labor Unskilled labor l and physical capital k can be real-
located freely across different establishments. Hence, the problem of how much l and k to rent at
factor prices W and R, is entirely static. We use Kt and Lt to denote the aggregate quantities,
and we use At to denote the average stock of organizational capital across all establishments and
vintages:
At =
∞∑
s=0
∫
A
AΦt,sdA,
where Φt,s denotes the measure over organizational capital at the start of period t for vintage s.
Physical capital and unskilled labor are allocated in proportion to the establishment’s organiza-
tional capital level At:
kt(At) =
At
At
Kt
lt(At) =
At
At
Lt.
This allocation satisfies the first order conditions and the market clearing conditions for capital and
labor. The fact that establishments with larger organizational capital A have more physical capital
and hire more unskilled labor suggests an interpretation of A as the size of the establishment.
The equilibrium wage rate Wt for unskilled labor and rental rate for physical capital Rt are
determined by the standard first order conditions:
Wt = νztA
1−ν
t FL(Kt, Lt)
ν−1, Rt = νztA
1−ν
t FK(Kt, Lt)
ν−1
The factor payments to unskilled labor and physical capital absorb a fraction (1− ν) of aggregate
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output Yt, where Yt is given by:
Yt = ztA
1−ν
t F (Kt, Lt)
ν .
In the remainder, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function F (k, l) = kαl1−α.
Organizational Rents A fraction ν of aggregate output Yt goes to organizational capital. These
organizational rents are split between the owners Πt, managers Ct, and sunk costs S
a
t = NtSt:
∞∑
s=0
∫
v
∫
A
pit(A, v)Ψt,s(A, v)d(A, v)−NtSt = Yt −WtLt − RtKt − Ct − S
a
t = Πt,
where the measure Ψt,s(A, v) is defined below. The second equality follows from (2.3) and ensures
that the goods market clears.
Discount Rate The payoffs are priced off the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution
(IMRS) of the representative owner. Just like the manager, the owner has constant relative risk
aversion preferences with parameter γ. His subjective time discount factor is ρo. Let gt denote the
rate of change in logDt. Then, the equilibrium log discount rate or “cost of capital” rt is given by
the owner’s log IMRS:
rt = ρo + γgt. (2.8)
Because there is no aggregate uncertainty and the owner holds a diversified portfolio of establish-
ments, the cost of capital evolves deterministically. Thus, our setting is equivalent to one with a
risk neutral owner who discounts future cash-flows, as in equation (2.2).
Managerial Compensation Having solved for the value function {Vt(·, ·)} that satisfies the
Bellman equation above for given {ωt(·), rt}, we can construct the optimal contract for a new
match starting at t {ct+j(h
t+j), βt+j(h
t+j)} in sequential form.
Outside Option We assume the sunk cost St grows at the same rate as output. Free entry
stipulates that the equilibrium value of a new establishment to the owner is equal to the sunk cost
St:
Vt (max(φAt, θt), ωt(At)) = St, (2.9)
The first argument indicates that a new establishment starts with organizational capital equal to
the maximum of the frontier level of technology θt and the organizational capital φAt that the
manager brought from the previous match. The total utility ωt(At) promised to the manager at
the start of a new match is such that the value of the new match is zero in expectation. Therefore,
equation (2.9) pins down the equilibrium outside option ωt(At).
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Law of Motion for Distributions We use χ to denote the implied probability density function
for At+1 given At. κ is an indicator function defined by the policy function for promised utilities:
κ (A′;A, v) = 1 if v′(A′;A, v) = v′, and equals 0 elsewhere. Using this indicator function, we can
define the transition function Q for (A, v):
Q ((A′, v′), (A, v)) = χ(A′|A)κ(A′;A, v).
We use Ψt,s to denote the joint measure over organizational capital A and promised utilities v for
matches of vintage s. Its law of motion is implied by the transition function:
Ψt+1,s+1(A
′, v′) =
∫
∞
0
∫ v
v
Q((A′, v′), (A, v))λt,s(A, v)d(A, v), (2.10)
where λt,s(A, v) is the measure of surviving establishments in period t of vintage s:
λt,s(A, v) =
∫ A
0
∫ v
v
β(a, u)dΨt,s(a, u) ≥ 0. (2.11)
In equilibrium, the mass of new establishments created in each period Nt (entry) equals the mass
of matches destroyed in that same period (exit):
Nt =
∞∑
s=0
∫
∞
0
∫ v
v
(1− βt,s(A, v))Ψt,s(A, v)d(A, v) ≥ 0.
2.4 Back-loading
The free entry condition implies that the expected net present discounted value of a start-up is
exactly zero: ∫
∞
0
∫ v
v
∞∑
j=0
e−
∑j
0
rsdspit+j(A, v)Ψt+j,s(A, v)d(A, v)− St = 0
Importantly, this does not imply that the organizational rents that flow to the owners are zero. As
long as discount rates r are strictly positive, the zero profit condition in (2.9) implies that expected
net payouts are strictly positive:∫
∞
0
∫ v
v
∞∑
j=0
pit+j(A, v)Ψt+j,s(A, v)d(A, v)− St > 0,
for two reasons. The first reason is a back-loading effect (see Atkeson and Kehoe (2005)). The
owners are compensated for waiting in the form of positive payouts. The more back-loaded the
payments are, the higher the expected payments. The expected payout profile of an establishment
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is steeply increasing: the first payout is a large negative number (-St), the establishment then grows
and starts to generate higher and higher profits (in expectation). Most of the organizational rents
are paid in the future. Second, there is a selection effect operative. Only the establishments that
have fast enough organizational capital growth (high enough ε shocks) survive. When we compute
aggregate (or expected) payouts, we are only sampling from the survivors who satisfy At > At(vt).
As pointed out by Hopenhayn (2002), selection among establishments can explain why Tobin’s
(average) q is larger than one on average. The aggregate value of establishments is given by the
present discounted value of a claim to {Dt}. It equals the sum of all equity values across all
establishment minus sunk costs plus the value of the physical capital stock Kt:
V at =
∞∑
s=0
∫
∞
0
∫ v
v
Vt(A, v)Ψt,s(A, v)d(A, v)− S
a
t +Kt ≥ Kt,
Tobin’s q, qt =
V at
Kt
, is larger than one on average, in spite of the fact that new matches are valued
at zero (net of their physical capital). The reason is again selection: when we compute q, we only
sample survivors. For future reference, we also define aggregate managerial wealth in the economy
as:
Mt =
∞∑
s=0
∫
A
∫
v
vt(A, v)Ψt,s(A, v)d(A, v).
It is the value of a claim to all the rents from organizational capital that flow to the managers.
2.5 Steady-State Growth Path
In a first step, we solve for a steady-state growth path in which all aggregate variables grow at a con-
stant rate. Aggregate establishment productivity {At} and the productivity of the newest vintage
{θt} grow at a constant rate gθ, the variables {rt, Rt, Nt} are constant, the general productivity-level
grows at a constant rate gz, and all other aggregate variables grow at a constant rate
g =
(
(1 + gz)(1 + gθ)
1−ν
) 1
1−αν . (2.12)
We normalize the population of unskilled labor L to one. To construct the steady-state growth
path, we normalize organizational capital by the frontier level of technology, and we denote the
resulting variable with a hat: Ât = At/θt. By construction, Â ≥ 1 for a new establishment. A
key insight is that the organizational capital of existing establishments, expressed in units of the
frontier technology, shrinks at a rate (1 + gθ):
log
(
Â′
)
= log
(
Â
)
− log (1 + gθ) + log (ε
′) . (2.13)
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The prime denotes next period’s value. The lower gθ, the higher the growth rate of Â. Below, we
introduce a secular decline in gθ. Appendix B contains a detailed definition of a steady-state growth
path. It shows how to express all other variables in efficiency units. Those variables are denoted
by a tilde in rescaled units. Finally, it reformulates the optimal contract along the steady-state
growth path. The Bellman equation is defined over the rescaled variables.
3 Properties of Compensation Contract
Although the managerial compensation contract allows for complicated history-dependence, the
optimal contract along a steady-state growth path turns out to have intuitive dynamics. Two
state variables summarize all necessary information: the current level of productivity At, which we
have given an interpretation as the size of the establishment, and the highest level of productivity
recorded thus far Amax,t, which we will give an interpretation as the book-to-market ratio of the
establishment.
3.1 No Discount Rate Wedge
First, we consider the case in which the manager and the owner are equally impatient (ρm =
ρo). The promised utility state variable vt can be replaced by the running maximum of the
productivity process: Âmax,t = max{Âτ , τ ≤ t}. We let T denote the random stopping time
when the establishment is shut down:
T = inf{τ ≥ 0 : V̂ (Âτ , v˜τ ) = 0}.
Proposition. Optimal management compensation along a steady-state growth path is determined
by the running maximum of productivity: c˜t(Âmax,t) = max
{
c0, C
(
ω(Âmax,t), Âmax,t
)}
for all
0 < t < T where the function C
(
v˜, Â
)
is defined such that the implied compensation stream
{c˜τ}
∞
τ=t delivers total expected utility v˜t to the manager.
Management compensation is constant relative to the productivity of the blueprint as long as
the running maximum is unchanged. The constancy is optimal because of the concavity of the
manager’s utility function, and arises as long as the participation constraint does not bind. When
the productivity process reaches a new high, the participation constraint binds, and the compen-
sation is adjusted upwards. Armed with this result, we can define the owner’s value recursively as
a function of Ât and the running maximum Âmax,t:
V˜ (Â, Âmax) = max
[
V̂ (Â, Âmax), 0
]
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and
V̂ (Â, Âmax) = y˜ − W˜ l − Rk˜ − c˜(Âmax) + e
−(ρo−(1−γ)g)
∫
V˜ (Â′, Â′max)Γ(ε
′)dε′,
subject to the law of motion for organizational capital in (2.13) and the implied law of motion for
the running maximum.
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of the optimal compensation. It plots Â on the vertical axis
against Âmax on the horizontal axis. By definition, Â ≤ Âmax, so that only the area on and below
the 45-degree line is relevant. New establishments start with Â = Âmax ≥ 1. When an establish-
ment grows and this growth establishes a new maximum productivity level, it travels along the
45-degree line. When its productivity level falls or increases but not enough to establish a new
record, it travels along a vertical line in the (Âmax, Â) space. The region [0, 1/φ] for Âmax is an
insensitivity region. Managerial compensation is constant (c˜ = c0) in this region. Compensation
is constant for small establishments because of the sunk cost. The manager will not leave because
his productivity level is insufficiently high to justify a new sunk cost. To the right of this region,
managerial compensation is pinned down by the binding outside option that was last encountered:
c˜(Âmax). As long as current productivity stays below the running maximum, the manager’s com-
pensation is constant. Along this ∆c˜ = 0 locus, the variation in current productivity is fully
absorbed by the net payouts to owners, as long as At stays above the V̂ = 0 locus. The owner
bears all downside idiosyncratic productivity risk. When productivity falls below this locus, the
match is terminated.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Growth and Value In the (Âmax, Â) space, there is a line with slope φ along which the owner’s
value is constant: V̂ = Ŝ. This is the locus of pairs for which Â = φÂmax. On this locus, an
existing establishment pays the same compensation as a new establishment and it has the same
productivity:
V̂
(
φÂmax, ω(Âmax)
)
= Ŝ, (3.1)
This means that the firm’s market-to-book ratio, or average q ratio, on this line is given by:
q = 1 +
V̂ (Â, Âmax)
k̂(Â)
= 1 +
Ŝ
k̂(Â)
This suggests a natural interpretation of the ratio of current productivity relative to the running
maximum as an indicator of the market-to-book ratio. Compare two establishments with the same
size Â. The establishment with the lower ratio of Â/Âmax has the same physical capital stock
k̂(Â), but higher (current and future) managerial compensation. This is because the manager
is compensated for the best past performance, which is substantially above current productivity.
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Hence, the value of its organizational capital going to the owners V̂ (Â, Âmax) is lower. These low
Â/Âmax firms have a low market-to-book ratio 1+ V̂ /k̂. They are value firms. High Â/Âmax firms
are growth firms. In Figure 1, firms with the same market-to-book ratio are on the same line
through the origin. Value firms are farther from the 45-degree line, growth firms are closer.
Organizational Capital as Collateral The limited portability of organizational capital creates
the collateral in the matches necessary to sustain risk sharing. Two extreme cases illustrate this
point. In the first case, there is no capital specific to the match and there are no other frictions,
as in Krueger and Uhlig (2005). The manager can transfer 100% of the organizational capital of
the establishment to a future match (φ = 1) and there are no sunk costs (Ŝ = 0). When φ = 1
in Figure 1, the V̂ = Ŝ line coincides with the 45-degree line. Therefore, V̂ ≤ Ŝ = 0 everywhere.
Limited liability then implies that V̂ = 0. Because there is no relationship capital, no risk sharing
can be sustained, and the managers earn all the rents from organizational capital. The value of
the owner’s stake in the organizational capital is zero. This implies that Tobin’s q equals one for
all t.
In the second case that we consider, φ = 0: all of the organizational capital is match-specific.
This is the case considered by Atkeson and Kehoe (2005). The insensitivity regions extends over
the entire domain of Â. The manager’s outside option is constant so that perfect risk sharing
can be sustained. There is zero dispersion in managerial compensation. The owner receives all
organizational rents, which is reflected in high q ratios.
Compensation and Payout Dynamics We use a random 300-period simulation from a cali-
brated version of the model to illustrate the compensation dynamics; the details of the calibration
are in section 4.2. Figure 2 tracks a single, successful establishment through time. The left panel
plots the realized (Âmax,t, Ât) values, as in Figure 1. The right panel shows the corresponding
time series for productivity (or size) Â (solid line, measured against the left axis) and managerial
compensation c˜ (dashed line, measured against the right axis). Because φ = 0.5, the insensitivity
regions extends until Â = 2. In that region the compensation is constant. When the establishment
size exceeds 2, around period 50, and leaves the insensitivity region, managerial compensation
starts to increase in response to increases in Â, i.e. every time a new running maximum for Â is at-
tained. The establishment moves along the 45-degree line in the left panel in the (Âmax,t, Ât) space.
The manager’s compensation does not track the downward movements in productivity/size that
occur between periods 75 and 100. This is the first vertical locus of points in the left panel. The
second big run-up in productivity increases the manager’s compensation once more. Eventually,
when the productivity level drops below the lower bound A(v), the owner’s residual value equals
zero V̂ = 0, the match is dissolved, and the manager switches to a new match. This endogenous
break-up is indicated by an arrow. A new match start off at productivity level max
(
φÂ, 1
)
. This
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second match only lasts for about 20 periods because of poor productivity shock realizations. The
third match on the figure lasts longer, but the establishment never leaves the insensitivity region,
so that wages are constant.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Figure 3 compares the managers payouts c˜ (left panel) and the owner’s payouts p˜i (right panel)
for the same history of shocks as the previous figure. The left panel is identical to the right panel
in Figure 2. The key message of the figure is that the owner’s payouts are more sensitive to
productivity shocks than the manager’s compensation. The dashed line in the right panel is more
volatile than the dashed line in the left panel. In the insensitivity region, the owner bears all the
risk from fluctuating productivity. In addition, whenever the productivity level falls below the
running maximum, the owner’s payouts absorb the entire decline in output. This is because the
owner provides maximal insurance to the risk-averse manager.
[Figure 3 about here.]
3.2 Discount Rate Wedge
In the benchmark case with equal rates of time preference for the managers and the owners, man-
agerial compensation does not respond to decreases in firm size and productivity. The management
is completely “entrenched”. In the quantitative section of the paper, we consider a less extreme
version, by allowing for a wedge between the discount rates of the management and the owners.
In particular, we consider the case in which the manager discounts cash flows at a higher rate
than the owner (ρm > ρo). This is the relevant case when the manager faces binding borrowing
constraints, has a lower willingness to substitute consumption over time, or simply has a higher
rate of time preference. This is a standard assumption in this literature; see DeMarzo et al. (2007)
for a recent example.
Proposition. Let tmax denote the random stopping time that indicates when the participation
constraint was last binding: tmax = sup{τ ≥ 0 : ω(Âτ ) = v˜τ}. Optimal management compensation
evolves according to: c˜t = c(Âtmax)e
−γ(ρm−ρo)(t−tmax) for all 0 < t. We define c(Âtmax) such that
{c˜τ}
∞
τ=tmax delivers total expected utility ω(Âtmax) to the manager.
Instead of Âmax, the new state variable is a discounted version of the running maximum; it
depreciates at a rate that is governed by the rate of time preference gap between the manager and
the owner. In the absence of binding participation constraints, managerial compensation c grows
at a rate smaller than the rate of value-added on the steady-state growth path. Put differently,
whenever the current productivity of the establishment declines below its running maximum, the
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manager’s scaled compensation c˜ drifts down. The left panel of Figure 4 illustrates this downward
drift, for example between periods 150 and 200. Management is less “entrenched”. This feature
will help to match equilibrium entry and exit rates in the data. Without it, the model generates
too much entry and exit.
[Figure 4 about here.]
4 Transition Experiment
We feed a gradual increase in general productivity growth into the model: gz ↑. To keep the
analysis tractable, we assume that the total productivity growth rate of the economy gt is constant
at its initial steady-state growth path value:5
g =
[
(1 + gt,z)(1 + gt,θ)
1−ν
] 1
1−αν . (4.1)
Holding fixed g, the increase in gz corresponds to a decrease in the rate of depreciation of organi-
zational capital Â in the stationary version of the model: gθ ↓. The growth composition change
allows existing firms in traditional industries to remain competitive longer, and grow larger. Their
organizational capital depreciates less quickly in 2005-2008 than in 1970-74 (see equation 2.13).
In Figure 1, a lower gθ has two distinct effects. First, it reduces the rate at which Â drifts down
along a vertical line. Second, it shifts more probability mass to higher realizations of Âmax. So,
a decrease in gθ shifts more probability mass closer to the 45-degree line, and more mass in the
northeast quadrant. Thus, the the growth composition change creates larger establishments and
more of them are growth rather than value firms. The increased importance of growth firms seems
intuitively consistent with the notion of the IT revolution.
Establishments accumulate more organizational capital and are longer-lived in the new steady
state. Because more establishments grow larger, the managers’ outside option constraint binds
more frequently. This increases the sensitivity of pay to performance. In addition, the arrival
of more large establishments increases the back-loading of the owner’s payouts. This raises the
owner’s average payouts in the cross-section as a fraction of output. Managerial compensation, in
contrast, is more front-loaded.
We study the transition between a low and a high general-purpose innovation growth path.
At t = 0, agents know the entire future path for {gt,θ}
T
t=0, although the arrival of the GPT itself
at t = 0 is not anticipated at t = . . . ,−2,−1. Appendix C defines the constant cost-of-capital
transition. It also explains the reverse shooting algorithm we use to solve for prices and quantities
5First, there is little evidence that the last 35 years have seen higher average GDP growth g than the 35-year
period that preceded it. Second, changing GDP growth along the transition path is computationally challenging.
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along the transition path. This is a non-trivial problem because we need to keep track of how the
cross-sectional distribution of (A, v) evolves over time. We then simulate the economy forward for
a cross-section of 5,000 establishments, starting in the initial steady state. We assume the change
in the relative importance of growth rates is accomplished in 20 years. However, the economy
continues to adjust substantially afterwards on its way to the final steady state.
4.1 Target Moments in the Data
Several of the model’s parameters were chosen to match moments of the data we describe below.
This is true for the decline in job reallocation, the increase in wage dispersion, and the initial exit
rate.
Increased Dispersion in Compensation We provide three sources of data, all of which doc-
ument a large increase in wage inequality. The first and broadest measure studies wages of all
workers. The data are from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) collected
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The unit of observation is an establishment, and the
data report the average wage. We calculate the within-industry wage dispersion from a panel of
55 2-digit SIC-code industries, and average across industries. Panel A of Table VI shows that the
cross-sectional standard deviation of log wages increased by 7.3, the IQR by 5.4, and the IDR by
14.7 percentage points between 1975-1979 and 2000-2004.6
The second body of evidence comes from managerial wages. While our model has implications
for overall wage inequality, managerial data arguably provide a cleaner match. We use wage
income data from the March Current Population Survey and select only workers in managerial
occupations (See Appendix A.4). Panel B of Table VI shows that in this sample, the cross-sectional
standard deviation of log wages increased by 9.4, the IQR by 11.3, and the IDR by 19.6 percentage
points between 1975-1979 and 2000-2004. Hence the increase in managerial compensation is more
pronounced than for the population at large.
The third and most narrow metric focusses on the top of the compensation scale. Measure
total compensation (salaries, bonuses, long-term bonus payments, and the Black-Scholes value of
stock option grants) for the three highest-paid officers in the largest 50 firms, Frydman and Saks
(2006) documents a strong increase in executive compensation. Panel C of Table VI uses the same
data to show an equally spectacular increase in the dispersion of top managers’ compensation.7
6According to Dunne et al. (2004), increasing within-industry, between-establishment wage dispersion accounts
for a large fraction of the increase in overall income inequality in the US. This is true especially for non-production
workers, which includes managers. They study US manufacturing establishments. Between 1977 and 1988, the
between-plant coefficient of variation for non-production worker’s wages increased from 44% to 56%, while the
within-plant dispersion actually decreased. They also document a similar increase in the dispersion of productivity
between plants.
7We thank Carola Frydman for graciously making these data available to us.
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Since the mid-1970s, the cross-sectional standard deviation of log compensation increased by 43
log points, the IQR and IDR more than doubled to 1.5 and 2.6, respectively. The inequality and
the increase in inequality are strongest for this group of executives.
[Table 1 about here.]
Declining Excess Job Reallocation The excess job reallocation rate is a direct measure of the
cross-sectional dispersion of establishment growth rates. It is defined as the sum of the job creation
rate plus the job destruction rate less the net employment growth rate. Before 1990, we only have
establishment-level reallocation data for the manufacturing sector. Figure 5 shows that the excess
reallocation rate in manufacturing declined from 10.9% in 1965-1969 to 8.4% in 2000-2005, and
further to 7.8% between 2006 and 2007.III. After 1990, the BLS provides establishment-level data
for all sectors of the economy. Over the 1990-2007 sample, the excess reallocation rate declined from
10.6 to 7.2% in manufacturing, from 15 to 12.4% in services, and from 15.6 to 12.3% in the entire
private sector. Half of this decline is due to a decline in entry and exit rates for establishments,
from 4% to 2.5%. The other half is due to a decline in expansions and contractions of existing
establishments.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Similar trends have been documented in firm-level (rather than establishment-level) data. Davis
et al. (2006) document large declines in the dispersion and the volatility of firm growth rates for the
US economy, either measured based on employment or sales growth. The employment-weighted
dispersion of firm growth rates declined from .70 in 1978 to .55 in 2001, while the employment-
weighted volatility of firm growth rates declined from .22 in 1980 to .12 in 2001. The former
measures the cross-sectional standard deviation of firm growth rates, while the latter measures
the standard deviation of firm growth rates over time.8 This decline in volatility is present across
sectors.
Finally, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1999) constructs a proxy for establishment-level reallocation
by studying intra-industry job flows. This is the only economy-wide series that is continually
available for our sample period. The excess reallocation rate for the non-financial sector declines
from 19% in 1960 to an average of 11.5% in 2000. This 19-11.5% change is what we calibrate to
in our benchmark model.
8Comin and Philippon (2005) show that there is an increase in volatility for the sub-sample of publicly traded
firms. Our analysis is for the entire non-financial sector, publicly-traded and privately-held. The discrepancy
between the findings for public and for all firms may have to do with private firms that go public earlier. The IPO
decision is outside of our model.
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Valuation The increase in the payouts to securities holders over the last 30 years coincided with
a doubling of Tobin’s average q and the value-output ratio. Tobin’s q is measured as the market
value of US non-financial corporations, constructed from the Flow of Funds data divided by the
replacement cost of physical capital:
qt = 1 +
V at
Kt
.
We construct the replacement cost of physical capital using the perpetual inventory method with
FoF investment and inventory data (see Appendix A.1). The first column in Table VII shows that
Tobin’s q decreased from 2.0 in the 1965-1969 period to 1.0 in the 1975-1979 period. After that,
it gradually increases to 2.6 in the 1995-1999 period and then it levels off to 2.3 and 2.0. The
value-output ratio for the US corporate sector, reported in Column (2), is computed as the ratio
of V at to gross value-added Yt. It tracks the evolution of Tobin’s q almost perfectly.
The value of US corporations per unit of physical capital has more than doubled since the
late seventies. The increase in valuations seems to be linked to the accumulation of organizational
capital rather than physical capital. Note that the secular increase in Tobin’s q cannot be explained
solely by a decrease in taxes. Indeed, in a model without organizational capital and no adjustment
costs, Tobin’s q is always one. In a world with reasonable adjustment costs, a decrease in taxes
could increase Tobin’s q above one, but only temporarily. Finally, the large deviations of Tobin’s
q from one occur in the second half of the sample when the average tax rate is slightly increasing.
[Table 2 about here.]
4.2 Benchmark Parameter Choices
In order to assess its quantitative implications, we calibrate the model at annual frequency. Table
I summarizes the parameters.
Production Technology and Preferences The parameter ν governs the decreasing returns
to scale at the establishment level. It is set to .75, at the low end of the range considered by
Atkeson and Kehoe (2005). The other technology and preferences parameters are chosen to match
the depreciation, the average capital-to-output ratio and the average cost of capital for the US
non-financial sector over the period 1950-2005. The depreciation rate δ is calibrated to .06 based
on NIPA data. Next, we calibrate the Cobb-Douglas productivity exponent on capital, α. Because
there is no aggregate risk, the rate of return on physical capital is deterministic in the model. In
equilibrium, that rate equals the discount rate. Both are fixed along the transition path. From the
Euler equation for physical capital, we get:
r =
(
1− δ + αν
Y
K
)
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We compute the cost of capital r in the data as the weighted-average realized return on equity and
corporate bonds; it is 5.5%. The weights are given by the observed leverage ratio.9 The average
capital-to-output ratio is 1.77. The above equation then implies αν = 0.23. As a result, α = 0.30.
We choose the rate of time preference of the owner ρo = .02 such that his subjective time
discount factor is exp(−ρo) = .98. In our benchmark results, we assume that the manager is less
patient: ρm = .03. Finally, we choose a coefficient of relative risk aversion γ = 1.6. This is the
value that solves equation (2.8) given our choices for r, ρo, and given the average growth rate of
real aggregate output of g = 0.022.
Organizational Capital Accumulation and Portability To calibrate the organizational cap-
ital accumulation, its portability, and the sunk costs of forming a new match, we match the excess
job reallocation rate and the firm exit rate in the initial steady state to those observed in the data
in 1970-74, and we match the increase in managerial wage inequality to that in the data.
Following Atkeson and Kehoe (2005), we assume the ε shocks are log-normal with mean ms
and standard deviation σs. We abstract from the dependence on these parameters on the vintage
s. For parsimony, the mean ms is set zero. However, younger matches (lower s) will grow faster
in equilibrium because of selection, even without age-dependence in ms. The standard deviation
σs = σ of these shocks is chosen to generate an excess job reallocation rate of 19% in the initial
steady state. This choice matches the 1970-74 reallocation rate in the data. The size of the sunk
cost (S) is chosen to match the entry-exit rates in the initial steady state. The sunk cost is equal
to 6.5 times the annual cash flow generated by the average firm. This delivers an entry/exit rate
of 4.3% in the initial steady-state, again matching the 1970-74 data. The portability or match-
specificity parameter φ governs the increase in wage dispersion in the model. We set it equal to
0.5, which means that 50% of organizational capital is transferable to a next match. This value of
the parameter enables the model to match the increase in intra-industry wage inequality.
Productivity Growth Composition In the baseline experiment, we assume the change in
the composition of growth to gnew,z occurs over 20 years, and we assume it starts in 1971. After
20 years, in 1990, productivity growth settles down at (gnew,z, gnew,θ). The actual transition to
a new steady-state growth path takes much longer. The change in the composition of growth
is calibrated to match the decline in reallocation rates in the data from 19% to 11%. General
productivity growth increases from gold,z = 0.3% in the initial steady state to gnew,z = 1.45%
in the new steady-state. Correspondingly, vintage-specific productivity growth decreases from
gold,θ = 5.5% to gnew,θ = 0.8%.
9Since the model has no taxes, but there are taxes in the data, we take into account the corporate tax rate (28%)
in the calculation of the cost of capital. Appendix D provides more details on the cost of capital calibration.
21
4.3 Main Results: Compensation and Size Distribution
We start by comparing the size and compensation distribution in the initial and final steady states,
as well as its evolution during the transition.
Figure 6 illustrates how a relatively modest change in the size distribution of firms, brought
about by a change in the composition of productivity growth, translates in a much larger change
in the distribution of compensation. The left panel plots the log compensation of managers (log c˜)
against the log of establishment size (log Â) in the initial steady-state growth path of the model.
The right panel shows the same plot for the final steady state growth path. Each dot represents
one establishment in the cross-section. The key to the amplification is the compensation contract.
The optimal contract features a lower bound on size below which the manager’s compensation does
not respond to changes in size. Above a certain size, the manager’s compensation only responds to
good news about the establishment’s productivity. In the initial steady state, few establishments
become large enough to exceed the insensitivity range. Managerial compensation hardly responds
to changes in size; there is little cross-sectional variation in compensation. The right panel shows
that this is no longer true in the new steady-state. Establishments live longer on average and the
successful ones grow larger. The log size distribution is more skewed than in the initial steady-
state. The figure shows a strong positive cross-sectional relationship between size and managerial
compensation. Thus, the model endogenously generates a shift from low-powered to high-powered
incentive compensation contracts.
[Figure 6 about here.]
On the new steady-state growth path, the distribution of managerial compensation has much
fatter tails than the size distribution, as shown in Figure 7. Its left panel shows the histogram of
log compensation in the new steady state; the right panel is the histogram of log size. Both were
demeaned. The distribution of managerial compensation is more skewed and it has fatter tails
than the size distribution. The kurtosis of log compensation is 19.82, compared to 3.38 for log size.
The skewness is 3.81 for log compensation, compared to .47 for log size.
[Figure 7 about here.]
There is a large finance literature that studies compensation for top managers (e.g., Frydman
and Saks (2006) and Kaplan and Rauh (2007)). Gabaix and Landier (2008) and other studies have
documented that managerial compensation is well-described by a power function of size, a finding
referred to as Roberts’ law. In our model too, the compensation distribution has much fatter tails
than a log-normal. On average, the relation between compensation and size in the new steady
state satisfies log c˜ = α+κ log Â. The slope coefficient κ is .24 in the new steady-state, close to the
value of 1/3 found in the empirical literature. Our model therefore not only provides a rationale
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for the large and skewed increase in managerial compensation, but is also quantitatively consistent
with the observed size-compensation distribution.
The model has implications for the size distribution of firms. Luttmer (2005) and others show
that the size distribution for large firms follows a Pareto distribution. The same is true for the
large firms in our new steady-state. Figure 8 shows that the relation between log rank and log size
is linear for large establishments. Quantitatively, the model’s Pareto coefficient is 1.5 whereas the
tails in the data are slightly thicker with a Pareto coefficient of 1.10 For small firms, the relationship
is less steep, a finding reminiscent of the city-size literature.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Table II reports the impact of the change in the composition of growth on the distribution
of compensation and productivity. The log of establishment productivity (TFP) is given by (1 −
ν) log Â. The log of the manager’s wage is given by log c˜. The left panel reports the cross-
sectional standard deviation, the inter-quartile range (IQR or 75th minus 25th percentiles), and
the inter-decile range (IDR or 90th minus 10th percentiles) for log wages; the right panel does the
same for log TFP. The first (last) line shows the values in the initial (final) steady-state. The
numbers in between are five-year averages computed along the transition path. Small changes in
the productivity (or size) distribution cause big changes in the distribution of compensation. The
standard deviation of managerial compensation increases by 7.3 percentage points in the first 35
years of the transition, similar to what we report later for the increase in within-industry wage
dispersion in the data.11 In the next ten years from 2006-2015, the standard deviation of log wage
dispersion is predicted to increase by another 4.5 percentage points and the IDR by as much as
11.5 percentage points.12 In sum, the shift towards high-powered incentives leads to a substantial
increase in income inequality.
To summarize, in the benchmark version of the calibrated model, the standard deviation of
log managerial compensation increases by 11 log points, the IQR by 8 log points and the IDR
by 9 log points over the same period. The IDR increases another 11 log points in the following
five years. This compares favorably to the data for workers and managers in Panel A and B in
Table VI. Finally, the model produces and increase of 50 log points in the IDR for the largest
500 establishments, 58 log point for the largest 50 establishments (see Table III). Of course, this
number still falls short of the 130 log points increase for top management in the largest 50 firms.
In the high portability case, the increase in the IDR is 80 log points. This massive increase in
compensation inequality is generated by a modest increase in productivity dispersion. As the right
10We follow Gabaix and Ibragimov (2007) who estimate the Pareto coefficient b from a regression of the form
log(Rank-1/2)=a-b log(Size).
11In the model, unskilled wages are equalized across establishments and do not affect the dispersion.
12In the new steady-state, compensation becomes very skewed: the IDR increases so much that the IQR actually
decreases.
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columns show, the standard deviation of productivity increases by only 1.5 percentage points in
the first 35 years of the transition. The IQR for increases from 18.3 to 18.4% and the IDR from
29.2 to 31.8% over the same period. Overall, productivity dispersion in our model is somewhat
smaller than what is found in the data. Using 1977 US manufacturing data at the 4-digit industry
level, Syverson (2004) reports a within-industry IQR of log TFP between 29 and 44%. Increasing
log TFP dispersion in the model would give rise to too much reallocation, absent other frictions.
Table III reports the sensitivity of managerial compensation to size for the 500 largest and
50 largest establishments in the model’s simulated panel. The top panel looks at the benchmark
calibration. We measure the sensitivity of managerial compensation to size by running a separate
cross-sectional regression of ∆ log ci on ∆ logAi in each time period. The slope of that regression
is referred to as the pay-performance elasticity. Columns (1) and (5) report the slope coefficients
(multiplied by 100) for the 500 and 50 largest firms, respectively. Columns (2) to (4) and (6) to (8)
report the dispersion of log compensation for these two samples. For the 500 largest firms, the pay-
performance elasticity increases from 0 to 5.86. I.e., every percent increase in size translates into
.056 percent increase in compensation. However, for the 50 largest establishments, the elasticity
increases from 3.4 to 46. In the data, Murphy (1998) finds that the cash compensation elasticity
for CEOs of S&P500 companies increases from 8 in 1972 to 40 in 1996.13
4.4 Labor Reallocation, Exit, and Firm Valuation
The right panel of Table II summarizes the other main aggregates of interest. The first column
shows the excess job reallocation rate. We calibrate the shift in the composition of productivity
so as to match the initial steady-state value of 19% as well as the subsequent decline to 12.2%
over the ensuing 35 years. The model successfully matches the decline in entry/exit rate (on a
steady-state growth path those are identical). The exit rate starts from 4.3% (chosen to match the
sunk costs) and declines to 3.0% by 2001-05. In the data, it declined from 4% to 2.5%. The exit
rate is highest in the first ten years of the transition because there is a shake-out of establishments
that are no longer profitable under the increased managerial compensation.
The last three columns of Table II report valuation ratios. As establishments start to live longer
and accumulate more organizational capital, the aggregate value of organizational capital starts to
increase. This is the same selection effect: We are only sampling the survivors when computing
the market value of matches. Correspondingly, Tobin’s q increases from 1.4 in 1971-75 to 1.6 in
2001-05 (Column (9)). The value of organizational capital as a fraction of value-added Vt/(Yt−S
a
t )
increases from 0.83 to 1.18, a 42% increase (Column (10)). The increase in the data from 1.54 to
13These elasticities are based on annual regressions of ∆ log(Cash Compensation) on log(1+Shareholder Return).
Cash compensation includes salaries, bonuses, and small amounts of other cash compensation. Data prior to 1992
are from Forbes Annual Compensation Surveys; data for 1992 and later are from Compustats ExecuComp database.
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2.41 represents a 45% increase (See Section 4.1).
Managerial workers capture only part of this increase in organizational rents because of the
sunk costs and limited portability of organizational capital. The sunk costs create an insensitivity
range in which managerial compensation does not respond to productivity shocks. In addition, the
discount rate wedge imputes a downward drift to the managerial compensation. As matches live
longer, managers end up with a smaller share of the surplus. Managerial wealth declines from 8.3%
of value-added to 7.2% (Column 7,M/(Y −Sa)). The model thus implies a large transfer of wealth
from the managers to the owners. However, there is an enormous amount of heterogeneity in the
evolution of managerial wealth to value-added (M/(Y − Sa)), echoing the increase in managerial
compensation dispersion documented earlier. We sort all managers by their final steady-state
M/(Y − Sa)- ratio. Managers in the 95th percentile saw a large increase, managers in the 90th
percentile maintained the status quo, while all other managers (especially those in the smaller
establishments) suffered a decline in wealth. Managers in the 5th see their wealth decline from 8
to 6.5 times (per capita) value added.
4.5 Robustness
The degree of portability φ governs several key aspects of the model. We studied both a higher
value (φ = .75) and a lower value (φ = 0) than our benchmark case (φ = .50). These results are
reported in Table IV and Table V. More portability amplifies the dispersion effect of the shift in
productivity growth composition, but lowers the increase in the valuation ratios.
The left panel of Table IV shows the compensation and productivity distribution along the
transition for the case in which all of the organizational capital is match-specific (φ = 0). As
we expected, the model no longer generates any increase in managerial compensation inequality.
Indeed, the managers are fully insured and the owners capture a larger share of the organizational
rents. The same results obtain in the case in which managers can fully commit to staying in the
match.
This all translates into to larger increases in the owners’ wealth relative to value-added and in
Tobin’s q ratio. These results are reported in the left panel of Table V. Tobin’s q goes up from
1.38 to 1.84, a substantially larger increase than in the benchmark case. In sum, the predictions
for valuation ratios improve, but the predictions for wage dispersion are counter-factual.
In contrast, increasing φ to a value of 0.75 gives managers more ownership rights to organiza-
tional capital. The right panel of Table IV shows the compensation and productivity distribution.
As a result, not only is initial income dispersion higher (the standard deviation of log wages is
9.6% instead of 0.9% in the initial steady-state), the increase in dispersion is also higher. The
standard deviation increases by 15, the IQR by 8 and the IDR by 42 percentage points from the
initial situation to 2001-05. These increases are much larger than in the benchmark case and fit
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the increase in managerial income inequality in the data better. Some other desirable features of
the φ = .75 calibration are that (i) Robert’s coefficient, which measures the elasticity of managerial
compensation to firm size, is 0.32, now matching the data exactly, and (ii) the Pareto coefficient
of the firm size distribution is 1.05, also matching the empirical estimates around 1. However, the
increase in valuation ratios is only half as big as in the benchmark case.
5 Additional Evidence from the Cross-Section
This section explores the cross-sectional relationship between managerial compensation dispersion
on the one hand and firm valuation on the the other hand, first in the model and then in the data.
The empirical evidence for the cross-sectional evidence on the link between wage dispersion and
firm valuation in the data, and the model’s ability to generate a similar link, lend further credibility
to the organizational capital accumulation mechanism we have put forward.
Our analysis so far focused on the time-series relationship between the composition of produc-
tivity growth, the reallocation rate, and Tobin’s q. In the model, these same relationships hold
in the cross-section. We use the calibrated model to illustrate this mechanism. We compute 13
different steady-state growth paths for 13 different economies, we label “industries.” All parame-
ters are constant across economies except for the vintage-specific growth rate gθ, which we vary in
equally-spaced increments from a low value of 0.00% to a high value of 6.82%. Figure 9 plots the
Tobin’s q ratio for each industry against its dispersion of managerial compensation. Reading from
the left to the right, as the vintage-specific growth rate declines, the average Tobin’s q increases
and so does the dispersion in managerial wage dispersion. Recalling Figure 2, a larger mass of
firms stays closer to the 45 degree line in such low vintage-specific growth industries.
The sensitivity of the valuations to changes in the reallocation rate is much higher for industries
with a low gθ area. Moving from the point labeled “1” to point “2” on Figure 9, Tobin’s q decreases
by 50 basis points in response to a 100 log points decrease in the dispersion of compensation. In
the data discussed below, estimates of the corresponding decrease in Tobin’s q vary between 111
and 70 basis points if we use a broad measure of wage dispersion and between 50 and 80 basis
points if we focus only on executive compensation dispersion. The same size increase in gθ, such
as the change from point 3 to 4, has smaller effects on q and wage dispersion when gθ is higher.
[Figure 9 about here.]
In the data, we identify high vintage-specific growth (gθ) industries, who experience faster de-
preciation of organizational capital, as those with lower cross-sectional dispersion in managerial
compensation. The key question then becomes whether industries characterized by higher dis-
persion also have lower valuation ratios. We build a panel of 55 industries at the 2-digit SIC
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level covering the 1976-2005 sample. As before, we exclude the financial sector to end up with 47
industries; see Appendices A.2 and A.3 for details. We examine the cross-sectional relationship
between compensation dispersion and the average Tobin’s q in this panel of 47 industries. We use
two different measures for the average Tobin’s q. The first measure (Tobin’s q1) uses total assets
less financial assets at book value in the denominator. The second measure (Tobin’s q2) uses the
book value of total assets in the denominator. The numerator in both ratios is the market value
of the firm. Appendix A.2 provides more details.
Our first estimation uses the cross-sectional standard deviation of log wages among the estab-
lishments within an industry from QWEC. We include fixed effects for time and industry in these
regressions. The results are reported in Table VIII. Our second estimation uses individual-level
wage data for executives from Execucomp to form the wage dispersion in an industry. These results
are reported in Table IX. For ease of comparison, we focus on the common sample 1992-2005. The
establishment-level data are available at quarterly frequency, while the executive data analysis is
at annual frequency. In the latter case, we average Tobin’s q across the quarters in a year.
Columns (1) and (3) of Table VIII show that there is a significantly positive covariation between
wage dispersion and Tobin’s q1 and q2 using the establishment-level data. The point estimates
imply that a one standard-deviation increase in the wage dispersion of a region (within-region
variation) increases Tobin’s q1 by 0.063 and Tobin’s q2 by 0.046. A region with a one standard de-
viation higher wage dispersion (across-region variation), has a Tobin’s q1 (q2) that is 0.417 (0.303)
higher. In specifications (2) and (4), we control for intangibles and continue to find strong posi-
tive correlation between the wage dispersion in an industry and its q ratio. While the interaction
effect is negative, the overall effect of wage dispersion is positive (last row). We find similarly
strong effects if we use the inter-quartile range of log wages instead of the standard deviation (not
reported).
[Table 3 about here.]
Table IX repeats the same analysis using a measure of wage dispersion for executives (See
appendix A.5). Wage dispersion is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the log wage among
executives within an industry. Executive wage dispersion in an industry is significantly positively
related to both measures of Tobin’s q (Columns (1) and (3)). A one standard deviation increase in
the within-industry wage dispersion (0.161) translates into a 0.123 increase in Tobin’s q1 and a 0.076
increase in Tobin’s q2. The marginal effect of wage dispersion on Tobin’s q slightly increases after
controlling for the intangibles ratio of the industry (Columns (2) and (4)). In this specification, the
effect of executive wage dispersion on Tobin’s q is stronger in industries with a higher intangibles
ratio. For example, in Column 2, the industry with the average intangible ratio shows a sensitivity
to a (within) one standard deviation increase in WDISP of 0.133, whereas that sensitivity increases
to 0.143 for an industry with an intangible ratio that is one standard deviation above the average.
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The results are very similar when using the value of options exercised instead of options granted
in the wage definition (not reported). The results using the inter-quartile range of log wages are
also similar (not reported), suggesting a robust correlation between managerial wage dispersion
and Tobin’s q.
[Table 4 about here.]
To sum up, we find that firms in high wage dispersion, low reallocation industries tend to have
higher Tobin’s q, as predicted by the model. In these industries, successful firms accumulate more
organizational capital.
6 Conclusion
In the last three decades, there has been a marked increase in managerial compensation inequality
and in the sensitivity of compensation to performance. This paper argues that both changes
can be tied to a compositional change in the nature of productivity growth and the increases in
organizational capital that resulted from it. In our model, establishments combine organizational
capital, physical capital and unskilled labor to produce output. The division of organizational rents
between the owner and the manager of the establishment is governed by a long-term compensation
contract. The well-diversified owner offers insurance to the risk averse manager, but this insurance
is limited by the manager’s ability to leave and by the owner’s limited liability. Because the manager
can transfer a fraction of the organizational capital to a future employer, the increased accumulation
of organizational capital improves the outside option of managers in successful firms, and the
manager’s compensation increases in response to positive performance. In small, unsuccessful
firms, compensation is insensitive to performance. The change in the composition of productivity
growth allows successful establishments to accumulate more organization capital and grow larger.
Together they account for the increase in compensation inequality. In addition, the model generates
an increase in firm valuation relative to the physical capital or to output, which reflects the higher
value of organizational capital. It is also broadly consistent with trends in labor reallocation, the
firm size distribution, and firm exit and entry.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Using Flow of Funds Data
The computation of firm value returns is based on Hall (2001). The data to construct our measure of
returns on firm value were obtained from the Federal Flow of Funds, henceforth FoF. 14 We use the
(seasonally-unadjusted) flow tables for the non-farm, non-financial corporate sector, in file UTABS 102D.
We calculate the market value of the corporate sector V a as the market value of equity (item 1031640030)
plus net financial liabilities. Net financial liabilities are defined as financial liabilities (item 144190005)
minus financial assets (item 144090005). Because outstanding bonds (a part of financial liabilities) are
valued at book value, we transform them into a market value using the Dow Jones Corporate Bond Index.
We construct the levels from the flows by adding them up, except for the Market Value of Equity. This
series is downloaded directly from the Balance series BTABS 102D. (item 103164003).
14Data are available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ RELEASES/z1/current/data.htm
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Net (aggregate corporate) pay-outs is measured as dividends (item 10612005) plus the interest paid on
debt (from the NIPA Table 1.14 on the Gross Product of Non-financial, Corporate Business, line 25) less
the net issuance of equity (item 103164003) less the increase in net financial liabilities (item 10419005).
The same NIPA Table 1.14 is used to obtain gross value-added (line 17), Yt − S
a
t .
Finally, capital expenditures (item 105050005) are obtained from the Flow of Funds.
Tobin’s q for the non-financial sector is constructed as the ratio of the market value of the corporate sector
V a and the replacement cost of physical capital (K). We construct the replacement cost of physical capital
using the perpetual inventory method with FoF investment data (item 105013003) and inventory data
(item 10502005). To deflate the series, we use the implicit deflator for fixed non-residential investment
from NIPA, Table 7.1. The depreciation rate is set to 2.6% per quarter.
A.2 Using Compustat Data
We use annual and quarterly data from Compustat.15 If an item from Compustat is not available quarterly,
we use its annual figure for each quarter, dividing by four if it is a flow variable. For each industry, the net
payout ratio is defined as the ratio of payouts to security holders over payouts to workers plus security
holders.
Payouts Payouts to security holders are computed as the sum of interest expense (item 22), dividends
from preferred stock (item 24), dividends from common stock (item 20) and equity repurchases, computed
as the difference between the purchase (annual item 115) and the sale (annual item 108) of common and
preferred stock. If there is no information available on the purchase and sale of stock, we assume that it
is zero.
Payouts to workers are computed as the product of number of employees (Compustat, annual item 29)
and wages per employee (see Appendix A.3 below). We only include those firms for which the payouts to
security holders is less than the firm assets (annual item 6).
The intangibles ratio is defined as the ratio of intangibles (annual item 33) to net property, plant and
equipment (PPE, annual item 8). We filter out those firms whose intangibles ratio is greater than 1000.
The intangibles ratio for each industry is then computed as the total intangibles over the total PPE for
each industry.
Tobin’s q The variable q1 is computed first for all firms having the following items available from COM-
PUSTAT: DATA1 (Cash and Short-Term Investments), DATA2 (Receivables - Total), DATA6 (Assets -
Total), DATA9 (Long-Term Debt - Total), DATA34 (Debt in Current Liabilities), DATA56 (Preferred
Stock - Redemption Value), DATA68 (Current Assets - Other), and the following items available from
CRSP: PRC (Closing Price of Bid/Ask average), SHROUT (Number of shares outstanding). For each
15Data are available at http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/
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firm, Tobin’s q is defined as follows
q1 =
totalvaluefirm
DATA6 - fin assets
,
where:
totalvaluefirm = mcap+ totaldebt− fin assets
totaldebt = DATA9 +DATA34 +DATA56
fin assets = DATA1 +DATA2 +DATA68
mcap = PRC ∗ SHROUT/1000.
We select only those firms for which 0 < q1 < 100. For the selected firms, we compute industry I’s Tobin’s
q as :
q1,agg =
∑
i∈I totalvaluefirmi∑
i∈I DATA6i − fin assetsi
.
We use a second definition of Tobin’s q. The variable q2 is defined as :
q2 =
firm value
DATA6
,
where
firm value = mcap+DATA6−DATA60−DATA74
mcap = PRC ∗ SHROUT/1000
and computed for all firms having the necessary items available in COMPUSTAT. We select only those
firms for which 0 < q2 < 100. For the selected firms, we compute industry I’s average q as:
q2,agg =
∑
i∈I firm valuei∑
i∈I DATA6i
A.3 Labor Reallocation
We use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW) program.16 This program reports monthly employment and quarterly wages data at the SIC
code level from 1975 to 2000, and at the NAICS code level from 1990 to 2005. Since there is no one-to-one
correspondence between SIC and NAICS codes, we form industries at the 2-digit SIC code level that
match industries at the 3-digit NAICS code level. We finally end up with 55 different industries, that
match to only 47 different Compustat industries. We exclude the financial sector from our calculations.
The employment data from the QCEW program is spliced in 1992.
We first compute the change in employment from month to month at the SIC and NAICS code level.
If it is positive it is recorded as Job Creation, otherwise it corresponds to Job Destruction. We then
16Data are available at http://www.bls.gov/
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aggregate Job Creation, Job Destruction and Employment by quarter, and de-seasonalize each of these
series separately using the X12-arima from the Census. Job Reallocation is then computed as the sum
of Job Creation and Job Destruction, divided by Employment. Excess Job Reallocation is computed
as the sum of Job Creation and Job Destruction minus the absolute change in Employment, divided by
Employment.
A.4 Managerial Wage Data from Current Population Survey
We use the IPUMS-CPS data on respondents’ annual wage earnings from 1971-2006. Managerial occu-
pations are defined as follows: for 1971-82, (previous year) occupation codes 220-246 except 221 and 226;
for 1983-1991, codes 003-019; for 1992-2002, codes 003-022; and codes 001-043 after 2002. We restrict
the sample to managers who were over 21 years old, were employed in the private sector, and who were
full-time workers in the previous year (i.e., they averaged at least 35 hours per week). We drop observa-
tions with annual earnings less than $2000 in 1983$. Finally, because wages are subject to top-coding,
we follow Autor et al. (2007) and multiply top-codes by 1.5 (this adjustment only affects the reported
standard deviations, not the IQR or IDR). The final sample size is about 3000 managers in the 1970s and
grows to around 6000 managers in the 2000s.
A.5 Managerial Wage Data from Execucomp
We use the Compustat Executive Compensation (Execucomp) data, which contains annual compensation
for top executives of over 2500 companies from 1992 to 2005, to compute the dispersion in managerial pay
within industries. Compensation is measured using Execucomp’s ”tdc1” and ”tdc2” variables. Both are
the sum of the manager’s salary, bonus, restricted stock grants, LTIP payouts, all other annual payments,
and value of options. The difference between the two compensation measures is in what they use for the
last term in the sum. Tdc1 uses the value of options grants, while tdc2 uses the value of options exercised.
We compute the standard deviation of the logs of these two compensation measures within each industry-
year in our data. This is then matched to our dataset on industries’ Tobin’s q and intangible ratios. We
are left with a total of 644 observations (46 industries over 14 years).
B Steady-State Growth Path
Definition 1. A steady-state growth path is defined as a path for which aggregate establishment pro-
ductivity {At} and the productivity of the newest vintage {θt} grow at a constant rate gθ, the variables
{rt, Rt, Nt} are constant, the economy-wide productivity-level grows at a constant rate gz, and all aggregate
variables {Yt,Kt,Wt, St, Ct,Dt, V
a
t } grow at a constant rate
g =
(
(1 + gz)(1 + gθ)
1−ν
) 1
1−αν .
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Along the steady-state growth path, the measure over establishment productivity and promised utilities
satisfies:
Ψt+1,s+1(A, v) = Ψt,s
(
A
1 + gθ
, v
)
,
the measure of active establishments satisfies:
λt+1,s(A, v) = λt,s
(
A
1 + gθ
, v
)
,
and the value of an establishment of vintage s evolves according to:
Vt+1(A, v; s + 1) = (1 + g)Vt
(
A
1 + gθ
, v(1 + g)1−γ , s
)
.
To construct the steady-state growth path, we normalize variables in efficiency units. This allows us
to restate the production technology as follows :
y˜t = k˜
αν
t ,
where a variable with a tilde, x˜t, denotes the variable, x, expressed in per capita terms and in adjusted
efficiency units of the latest vintage (blueprint):
x˜t =
xt
z
1
1−αν
t θ
1−ν
1−αν
t
.
We have normalized the population L to one.
As noted in the main text, we normalize productivity by the blueprint level of technology, and denote
the normalized variables with a hat: Ât = At/θt. By construction, Â ≥ 1 for a new establishment (vintage
zero). The organizational capital of existing establishments in the new efficiency units shrinks at a rate
(1 + gθ). See equation (2.13). This notation allows us to reformulate the optimal contract along the
steady-state growth path.
The owner maximizes his value V̂ (Â, v˜) by optimally choosing current compensation c˜ and future
promised utilities v˜′(·):
V˜ (Â, v˜) = max
[
V̂ (Â, v˜), 0
]
and
V̂ (Â, v˜) = max
c˜,v˜′(·)
[
y˜ − W˜ −Rk˜ − c˜
+e−(ρo−(1−γ)ĝ)
∫
V˜ (Â′, v˜′)Γ(ε′)dε′,
]
subject to the law of motion for organizational capital in (2.13), the promise keeping constraint
v˜ = u(c˜) + e−(ρm−(1−γ)ĝ)
[∫
βs′(v˜, ε
′)v˜′(Â′)Γ(ε′)dε′ + ω˜(Â′)
∫
(1− β(v˜, ε′))Γ(ε′)dε′
]
, (B.1)
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and subject to participation constraints for all Â′:
v˜′(Â′) ≥ ω˜(Â′).
The indicator variable β is one if continuation is optimal and zero elsewhere:
β = 1 if v˜′
(
Â′
)
≤ v˜∗(Â′)
β = 0 elsewhere
The outside option process is determined in equilibrium by the zero-profit condition for new entrants:
V̂
(
max(Âφ, 1), ω(Â)
)
= S, (B.2)
Equation (B.2) implies that the outside option ω(Ât) is constant in the range A ∈ [0, φ
−1]. We refer to
this range as the insensitivity region, because the outside option does not depend on the organizational
capital accumulated in the current establishment. When the fraction of capital φ that is portable is zero,
the outside option is constant for all A > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. The first-order condition implies that compensation c˜ is constant as long as the participation
constraint does not bind. When a new match is formed, the normalized promised utility v˜ starts off
at v˜0 = ω(Ât). The dynamics of the optimal wage contract can be characterized by setting up the
Lagrangian. Let µ denote the multiplier on the promised utility constraint and let λ(Â′) denote the
multiplier on the participation constraint in state Â′. We assume V̂ (·) is strictly concave and twice
continuously differentiable. When the participation constraint Â′ does not bind (λ(Â′) = 0), conditional
on continuation of the relationship (β = 1), the law of motion for the promised utility in efficiency units
v˜ satisfies the first order condition:
µ =
−∂V̂ (Â′, v˜′)
∂v˜′
The left hand side is the cost to the owner of increasing the manager’s compensation today. It equals
µ, the shadow price of a dollar today, from the envelope condition. From the first order condition for
consumption we know that µ = 1/uc(c˜). The right-hand side is the cost of increasing the manager’s
compensation tomorrow, from the first-order condition for v˜′. From the envelope condition, this equals
µ′ = 1/uc(c˜
′). So, the first order condition implies that consumption c˜ must be constant over time, as long
as the manager’s participation constraint does not bind. As a result, actual managerial compensation c
grows at the rate of output growth g on the steady-state growth path. When the participation constraint
does bind, the following inequality obtains:
µ <
−∂V̂ (Â′, v˜′)
∂v˜′
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The utility cost of increasing the manager’s compensation to the owner increases. From the concavity of
u(·), it follows that the manager’s promised utility and current compensation (in efficiency units) increase
when the participation constraint binds. When the constraint does bind, we increase c˜ to make sure the
constraint holds with equality. This is optimal (see Kuhn-Tucker conditions).
This suggests a simple consumption rule is optimal. We conjecture the optimal consumption function
C
(
v˜, Â
)
such that:
C
(
v˜, Â
)
= u−1c (1/µ)
where µ = −∂V̂ (Â,v˜)
∂v˜
. Define the running maximum of Â as Âmax,t = max{Âτ , τ ≤ t}. In addition, let T
denote the random stopping time when the match gets terminated because of zero surplus:
T = inf{τ ≥ 0 : V̂ (Âτ , v˜τ ) = 0}
Compensation is determined by the running maximum of productivity for all 0 < t < T :
ct = c(Âmax,t) = max
{
c0, C
(
ω(Âmax,t), Âmax,t
)}
.
This consumption function satisfies the necessary and sufficient Kuhn-Tucker conditions if the continuation
probability β is non-increasing in Â. This being the case, the participation constraint only binds if
Â exceeds it previous maximum. It is easy to verify that β is indeed non-increasing in Â given this
consumption function.
Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. The discount rate wedge induces a downward drift in the manager’s consumption and promised
utility. When the participation constraint does not bind, the envelope condition and the first order
condition for v˜′ imply the following:
−∂V̂ (Â, v˜)
∂v˜
= µ = e(ρm−ρo)
−∂V̂ (Â′, v˜′′)
∂v˜′
Because eρm−ρo > 1, the owner’s utility cost of providing compensation tomorrow is lower than µ, the
cost today. As a result, the optimal promised utility is decreasing over time. Because µ = u−1c (c˜), this
also implies that current consumption drifts down. By construction, this consumption policy satisfies the
necessary and sufficient first order conditions for optimality.
C Transition Experiment
Definition 2. A constant-discount rate transition between two steady state growth paths is defined as a
path for which the productivity of the newest vintage grows at rate gt,θ, the economy-wide productivity-level
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grows at a rate gz,t, and all aggregate variables {Yt,Kt, wt, Ct}t=0,T have a constant trend growth rate
g =
(
(1 + gz)(1 + gθ)
1−ν
) 1
1−αν .
The rental rate on capital Rt and the discount rate rt are constant. The measure over promised utilities
and establishment productivity satisfies (2.10) and (2.11) during the transition. At t = T , this economy
reaches its new steady-state growth path. So for i > 1:
ΨT+i,s(A, v) = ΨT+i−1,s
(
A
1 + gθ
, v
)
(C.1)
λT+i,s(A, v) = λT+i−1,s
(
A
1 + gθ
, v
)
. (C.2)
Output deviates from its trend growth path during the transition because the average establishment
productivity level deviates from its initial steady-state growth path {Aold,t}. The average productivity
levels changes, because the joint measure over establishment-specific productivity and promised utility is
changing. Along the transition path, we check that the rental rate for physical capital is constant:
Rt = αvK˜
αν−1
new,t = αv
(
K˜old,t
)αν−1
,
where K˜t =
Kt
A
1−ν
1−αv
t z
1
1−αν
t
denotes the capital stock in adjusted efficiency units. The aggregate capital stock
is adjusted such that
ϕt =
K̂new,t
K̂old,t
=
(
Anew,t
Aold,t
) 1−ν
1−αv
.
Capital is supplied perfectly elastically at a constant interest rate. Along the transition path, all aggregate
variables {Ynew,t,Knew,t,Wnew,t, Cnew,t}t=0,T are scaled up by ϕt. This is the productivity adjustment
relative to the old steady-state growth path. Once we have computed {ϕt}, we can back out the transition
path for all the other variables.
Reverse Shooting Algorithm The objective is to compute the transition for the value function,
aggregate productivity, the outside option function and the joint measure over promised consumption
and productivity {Vt, At, ωt,Ψt,s, λt,s}. We start in the new steady state with the new vintage-specific
growth rate gθ,T at T , and the “stationary” joint measure ΨT,s over organizational capital and promised
consumption, which satisfy the conditions in equation (C.2). We conjecture a {ϕt}
T
t=0 sequence. Because
we know V̂T , the owner’s value of an establishment at the beginning of period t can be constructed
recursively, starting in i = 1:
V̂T−i(Â, v˜; s) = max
c˜,v˜′t(·)
[
y˜T−i+1 −W −Rk˜T−i+1 − c˜T−i+1
+R−1(1 + g)
∫
V˜T−i+1(Â
′, v˜′; s+ 1) Qs′(ε
′)dε′
]
,
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subject to the law of motion for capital in (2.13), the promised consumption constraint in (B.1), and a
series of participation constraints:
v˜′ ≥ ω˜T−i+1(A
′)
and, finally, the value of the firm is defined as:
V˜T−i(Â, v˜) = max
[
V̂T−i(Â, v˜), 0
]
.
We solve for {Vt, At, ωt,Ψt,s, λt,s}
T
t=1 starting in the last period T .
Simulating Forward Next, we simulate this economy forward, starting at the initial values for(
V0, A0, ω0,Ψ0,s, λ0,s
)
in the old steady-state growth path, using our solution for the transition path
{Vt, At, ωt,Ψt,s, λt,s}
T
t=1. We use a sample of N = 5000 establishments. This gives us a new guess for the
aggregate establishment productivity series and hence for {ϕ′t}
T
t=0. We continue iterating until we achieve
convergence.
D Calibration Details
To calibrate the depreciation rate, the tax rate and the capital share αν, we used mostly NIPA data.
Let CFC denote the consumption of fixed capital. Let KINV denote the stock of inventories, obtained
from NIPA Table 5.7.5B. (Private Inventories and Domestic Final Sales by Industry). Let KES denote
fixed assets, obtained from NIPA Table 6.1. (Current-Cost Net Stock of Private Fixed Assets by Industry
Group and Legal Form of Organization). The depreciation rate is computed as
δ = CFC/(KES +KINV ).
The average tax rate τc is computed as follows. Let CT denote corporate taxes, let NP denote net product,
let ST denote Sales Taxes, and let SLPTR denote state and local taxes. The tax rate is computed as
τc = CT/(NP − CE − ST ),
where we compute ST as CT − RATIO × SLPTR and RATIO is the average ratio of fixed assets held
by non-farm, non-financial corporations to total fixed assets.
To compute the average cost of capital r, we computed the weighted-average of the average return
on equity and the average return on corporate bonds over the period 1950-2005. The average return on
corporate bonds was computed using the Dow Jones corporate bond index.17. The average return on
equity is computed from the log price/dividend ratio and a constant real growth rate for dividends of
1.8%, the average growth rate over the sample.18 The dividend series and the price/dividend ratio from
17Data are available at http://www.globalfinancialdata.com
18Data are available at http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu
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CRSP are adjusted for repurchases. The weights in the average are based on the aggregate market value
of equity and corporate bonds. The resulting average cost of capital is 5.5%.
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Table I: Benchmark Calibration
Parameter Value Source
ν .75 Atkeson and Kehoe (2005)
δ .06 NIPA
α .30 K/Y = 1.77
r .055 FoF,CRSP,DJCBI
ρo .02
ρo .03
γ 1.6 equation (2.8)
g .022 NIPA
ms 0
σs 19% exc. reall. rate job reallocation - QCEW BLS
S 4.3% exit rate entry and exit
φ 0.5 wage inequality - QCEW BLS
Notes: This Table lists our benchmark parameter choices. Section 4.2 justifies these choices and Appendix D provides more details on the data we used. NIPA stands for
National Income and Products Accounts, CRSP for Center for Research in Securities Prices, DJCBI for Dow Jones Corporate Bond Index, QCEW stands for Quarterly Census
of Employment and Wages, and BLS for Bureau of Labor Statistics. The abbreviation “exc. reall. rate” stands for excess reallocation rate in the initial steady state.
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Table II: Main Results-Benchmark Calibration
Log Compensation Log Productivity Aggregates
Std IQR IDR Std IQR IDR EREALL EXIT Tobin’s q V(Y−Sa)
M
(Y−Sa)
before 0.94 0.01 0.08 10.69 18.27 29.16 18.96 4.33 1.40 0.83 8.27
1971-1975 1.48 0.01 0.09 10.80 18.32 28.99 17.83 7.74 1.40 0.83 8.04
1976-1980 1.24 0.01 0.08 11.00 18.25 29.13 16.62 6.65 1.43 0.89 7.88
1981-1985 1.75 0.01 0.10 11.09 18.42 29.38 15.30 5.62 1.46 0.93 7.72
1986-1990 2.31 0.02 0.11 11.26 18.32 29.80 13.52 4.08 1.50 1.00 7.51
1991-1995 4.34 0.03 0.13 11.67 18.43 30.76 12.87 3.56 1.54 1.07 7.37
1996-2000 6.41 0.09 11.77 11.79 18.05 30.84 12.70 3.53 1.56 1.12 7.29
2001-2005 8.22 0.13 9.73 12.22 18.36 31.78 12.26 3.05 1.59 1.18 7.22
2006-2010 11.03 8.63 8.94 12.58 18.53 32.58 12.02 2.94 1.62 1.23 7.17
2011-2015 12.78 8.82 21.47 12.57 18.50 32.52 11.90 2.84 1.62 1.22 7.11
after 26.98 0.09 35.07 15.36 21.14 38.98 11.35 1.20 1.64 1.26 6.47
Notes: The panel on the left reports the cross-sectional standard deviation (Std), inter-quartile range (IQR) and the inter-decile range (IDR) for log
compensation log c˜ and log productivity (1−ν) log Â in percentage points. The panel on the right reports the excess job reallocation rate (EREALL), the
entry/exit rate (EXIT), Tobin’s q, the ratio of aggregate firm value to output (V/(Y −Sa)), and the ratio of managerial wealth to output (M/(Y −Sa)).
The economy transitions from high vintage-specific growth gθ,0 before 1971 to low vintage-specific growth gθ,T after 1971. The transition takes place
over T = 20 years. The results are for the benchmark parameters.
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Table III: Compensation Sensitivity in Large Firms-Benchmark Calibration
Top 500 Top 50
∆c/∆A Std IQR IDR ∆c/∆A Std IQR IDR
1971-1975 −1.68 3.76 0.20 3.51 3.35 8.99 0.39 0.86
1976-1980 0.14 3.55 0.27 0.53 1.08 10.83 0.57 4.79
1981-1985 0.48 4.86 0.41 0.61 6.59 13.71 1.95 27.05
1986-1990 1.03 6.98 0.43 0.65 15.87 16.80 12.83 36.25
1991-1995 1.76 10.36 0.49 3.77 18.86 22.19 28.02 52.99
1996-2000 3.72 13.90 0.49 25.14 37.58 23.88 28.30 54.81
2001-2005 6.08 19.22 2.41 39.25 53.67 25.07 31.83 54.92
2006-2010 5.86 24.12 11.18 52.04 49.89 28.03 32.85 62.17
2011-2015 8.72 29.04 20.97 66.64 46.63 31.11 37.41 86.63
Notes: This table reports the sensitivity of compensation to size, the cross-sectional standard deviation (Std), inter-quartile range (IQR) and the
inter-decile range (IDR) for log compensation log c˜ for the 500 and 50 largest establishments. The economy transitions from high vintage-specific growth
gθ,0 before 1971 to low vintage-specific growth gθ,T after 1971. The transition takes place over T = 20 years. The table reports the ratio of market
value of the establishment to the aggregate capital stock, at different percentiles of the cross-sectional market value distribution. The results are for the
benchmark parameters.
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Table IV: Robustness: Compensation and Productivity
No Portability High Portability
Log Compensation Log Productivity Log Compensation Log Productivity
Std IQR IDR Std IQR IDR Std IQR IDR Std IQR IDR
before 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.77 18.52 29.45 9.61 0.46 5.24 13.73 23.33 38.51
1971-1975 0.02 0.00 0.00 10.06 17.46 26.41 14.79 0.51 19.54 13.63 23.57 37.50
1976-1980 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.49 15.85 24.67 12.74 5.47 16.50 13.87 23.61 37.62
1981-1985 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.33 15.12 24.46 13.52 10.74 14.46 14.17 23.58 38.09
1986-1990 1.12 0.00 0.00 9.41 14.87 24.54 14.99 8.60 16.32 14.47 23.48 38.50
1991-1995 2.00 0.00 4.86 9.72 14.24 25.50 19.57 8.27 19.30 14.84 23.88 38.98
1996-2000 3.18 1.83 6.50 10.08 14.38 26.34 23.21 8.29 36.65 15.14 24.04 39.55
2001-2005 3.46 4.57 8.07 10.50 14.64 27.21 25.68 8.37 49.22 15.60 24.20 41.01
2006-2010 4.27 6.43 8.70 10.99 15.17 28.34 29.12 8.69 53.04 16.07 24.75 42.01
2011-2015 4.47 7.68 11.41 11.31 15.54 28.74 31.32 9.29 56.28 16.52 25.27 43.21
after 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.43 16.81 33.17 48.56 29.45 98.49 21.19 32.19 55.35
Notes: The panel on the left shows results for φ = 0 (no portability). The panel on the right shows results for φ = .75 (high portability). The economy
transitions from high vintage-specific growth gθ,0 before 1971 to low vintage-specific growth gθ,T after 1971. The transition takes place over T = 20
years. The table reports the cross-sectional standard deviation (Std), inter-quartile range (IQR) and the inter-decile range (IDR) for log compensation
log c˜ and log productivity (1− ν) log Â in percentage points. The results are for the benchmark parameters.
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Table V: Robustness: Aggregate Variables
Low Portability High Portability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EREALL EXIT Tobin’s q V(Y−Sa)
M
(Y−Sa) EREALL EXIT Tobin’s q
V
(Y−Sa)
M
(Y−Sa)
before 18.93 4.32 1.36 0.74 6.02 17.67 3.40 1.37 0.76 4.99
1971-1975 21.78 11.68 1.38 0.82 7.61 18.03 7.14 1.35 0.72 4.48
1976-1980 18.49 9.07 1.43 0.89 7.59 14.94 4.70 1.38 0.76 4.54
1981-1985 16.26 7.06 1.49 1.01 7.51 14.37 4.33 1.40 0.80 4.61
1986-1990 14.59 5.67 1.58 1.16 7.42 12.15 2.46 1.44 0.86 4.58
1991-1995 13.20 4.29 1.66 1.32 7.24 12.27 2.52 1.45 0.88 4.59
1996-2000 12.64 3.85 1.72 1.43 7.12 11.86 2.40 1.46 0.91 4.54
2001-2005 11.92 3.03 1.77 1.52 6.97 11.32 1.74 1.47 0.92 4.49
2006-2010 12.05 3.22 1.81 1.60 6.92 11.63 2.21 1.47 0.92 4.50
2011-2015 11.87 2.98 1.84 1.66 6.84 10.75 1.36 1.48 0.93 4.46
after 11.50 1.48 2.11 2.19 5.77 11.24 0.84 1.45 0.89 4.09
Notes: The panel on the left shows results for φ = 0 (low portability). The panel on the right shows results for φ = .75 (high portability). The
economy transitions from high vintage-specific growth gθ,0 before 1971 to low vintage-specific growth gθ,T after 1971. The transition takes place over
T = 20 years. The table reports the excess job reallocation rate (EREALL), the entry/exit rate (EXIT), Tobin’s q, the ratio of aggregate firm value to
output (V/(Y − Sa)), and the ratio of managerial wealth to output (M/(Y − Sa)). The results are for the benchmark parameters.
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Table VI: Increasing Wage Dispersion
Std IQR IDR
Panel A: All Workers
1975-1979 21.4 29.1 53.2
1980-1984 22.9 29.3 57.2
1985-1989 24.2 30.8 58.5
1990-1994 25.1 31.6 61.1
1995-1999 26.9 32.8 65.7
2000-2004 28.7 34.5 67.9
Panel B: All Managers
1975-1979 59.4 72.9 140.8
1980-1984 61.3 79.8 147.5
1985-1989 62.9 82.5 152.7
1990-1994 64.8 83.8 156.6
1995-1999 67.2 83.3 157.7
2000-2004 68.8 84.2 160.4
Panel C: Top-3 Managers
1975-1979 55.7 74.1 135.1
1980-1984 58.3 74.0 146.7
1985-1989 69.7 90.2 172.6
1990-1994 76.9 100.0 186.8
1995-1999 92.6 124.0 231.7
2000-2004 99.4 149.5 260.9
Notes: All three panels plot the cross-sectional standard deviation, inter-quartile range, and inter-decile range of log
wages. Statistics are averaged over 5-year periods. In Panel A, we measure intra-industry, between-establishment
wage inequality. The data are from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) collected by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The unit of observation is an establishment, for which we know the average
wage. We calculate the within-industry wage dispersion from a panel of 55 2-digit SIC-code industries, and average
across industries. In Panel B, we use individual-level data from the Current Population Survey, March issue. We
select only the managerial occupations. Finally, Panel C uses data from Frydman and Saks (2006) for the three
highest-paid officers in the largest 50 firms in 1960 and 1990.
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Table VII: Valuation Ratios for US Corporate Sector
(1) (2)
Tobin’s q V/(Y − Sa)
1965-1969 1.96 1.80
1970-1974 1.49 1.54
1975-1979 0.97 1.13
1980-1984 0.94 1.16
1985-1989 1.33 1.49
1990-1994 1.70 1.82
1995-1999 2.58 2.53
2000-2004 2.33 2.41
2005-2008.I 2.04 2.19
Notes: Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of US corporations V a divided by the replacement cost of the
physical capital stock K. The value-output ratio (V/(Y − Sa)) is the market value of US corporations V a divided
by value-added Y − Sa of the non-financial corporate sector.
Table VIII: Cross-sectional Results: Tobin’s q and Establishment-Level Wage Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.401 -0.341 0.232 0.264
(0.296) (0.293) (0.187)*** (0.185)***
INTAN 0.117 0.086
(0.167) (0.105)
WDISP 1.113 1.131 0.789 0.801
(0.196)*** (0.194)*** (0.123)*** (0.122)***
WDISP*INTAN -0.275 -0.174
(0.129)** (0.064)*
∆ Tobin q / ∆ WDISP 0.981 0.706
(0.199)*** (0.125)***
Number of Industries 47
Observations 2632
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. This table reports fixed effects estimates of
Tobin q1 and Tobin q2 on wage dispersion (WDISP) for the periods 1992-2005. Wage dispersion is measured as the
cross-sectional standard deviation of log wages across establishments within an industry. The regressions include
year and industry fixed effects. The definition of these variables is detailed in Appendix A.2. Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses.
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Table IX: Cross-sectional Results: Tobin’s q and Executive Wage Dispersion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.627 0.750 1.039 1.117
(0.163)*** (0.175)*** (0.101)*** (0.104)***
INTAN -0.453 -0.276
(0.103)*** (0.066)***
WDISP 0.765 0.756 0.469 0.459
(0.174)*** (0.184)*** (0.108)*** (0.112)***
WDISP*INTAN 0.122 0.077
(0.061)** (0.045)*
∆ Tobin q / ∆ WDISP 0.823 0.502
(0.172)*** (0.105)***
Number of Industries 46
Observations 644
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. This table reports fixed effects estimates
of Tobin q1 and Tobin q2 on wage dispersion (WDISP) for the periods 1992-2005. Wage dispersion is measured as
the cross-sectional standard deviation of log wages across individual executives within an industry. Wages are the
sum of the manager’s salary, bonus, restricted stock grants, LTIP payouts, all other annual payments, and value of
options granted (“tdc1”). The regressions include year and industry fixed effects. Further detail on the data is in
Appendix A.2 and A.5. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Optimal Compensation and Size
This figure plots the running maximum of productivity on the horizontal axis, Âmax,t against current productivity,
Ât, on the vertical axis. It considers the case in which managers and owners share the same rate of time preference
ρm = ρo.
I
V S!
1
1 1
I
0;  
t t
V V S'   
0V  
.
45
Termination
0
t
c'  
gT
Aˆ
maxAˆ
0max )
ˆ(ˆ cACct ! 0ˆ cc t  
51
Figure 2: Optimal Compensation Contract
The left panel plots the current productivity At (y-axis) against the running maximum Amax,t (x-axis). The right
panel figure plots the evolution of the optimal current consumption of the manager c˜ (dashed line) alongside the
evolution of the establishment’s organizational capital Â (full line). The latter is a measure of size and productivity
of the establishment. The two time-series are produced by simulating model for 300 periods (horizontal axis) under
the benchmark calibration described below (φ = .5), except that the time discount rates of owners and managers
are held equal: ρo = ρm.
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Figure 3: Payouts to Manager and Owner
The left panel plots the evolution of the optimal current consumption of the manager c˜ (dashed line, measured
against the right axis) alongside the evolution of the establishment’s organizational capital Â (full line, measured
against the left axis). The right panel plots the payouts to the owner pi. The two time-series are produced by
simulating the model for 300 periods (horizontal axis) under the benchmark calibration described below, except
that the time discount rates of owners and managers are held equal: ρo = ρm.
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Figure 4: Payouts to Manager and Owner: Discount Rate Wedge
The left panel plots the evolution of the optimal current consumption of the manager c˜ (dashed line, measured against
the right axis) alongside the evolution of the establishment’s organizational capital log Â (full line, measured against
the left axis). The right panel plots the payouts to the owner pi. The two time-series are produced by simulating
the model for 300 periods (horizontal axis) under the benchmark calibration described below, except that the time
discount rates of owners and managers are held equal: ρo < ρm.
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Figure 5: Excess Reallocation Rate
The blue bars show the excess reallocation rate for the manufacturing sector, constructed by Faberman (2006). The
excess job reallocation rate is a direct measure of the cross-sectional dispersion of establishment growth rates. It is
defined as the sum of the job creation rate plus the job destruction rate less the net employment growth rate. The
Faberman data are extended to 2007.III using BLS data. The red bars show the excess reallocation rate for the
private sector (BLS).
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Figure 6: From Low-Powered to High-Powered Incentives
Plot of log compensation against log size of establishment. The left panel shows the initial steady-state growth path
(high vintage-specific growth). The right panel shows the new steady-state growth path (high general productivity
growth). The data are generated from the model under its benchmark calibration.
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Figure 7: Compensation and Size Distribution on the New Steady State Growth Path
Histogram of log compensation and log size of establishments. The data are generated by simulating the model’s
new steady-state growth path(high general productivity growth) under its benchmark calibration.
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Figure 8: Size Distribution in the New Steady State
The figure plots the relationship between the log size of establishments on the horizontal axis and the rank in the
distribution log(Rank − .5) on the vertical axis. The figure is for the new steady state growth path under our
benchmark calibration.
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Figure 9: Cross-section
Scatter plot of steady-state growth path Tobin’s q against the standard deviation of log compensation for 13
industries with gθ varying from low (.00%) on the right side to high (6.82%) on the left side. The results are for the
benchmark parameters.
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